Federal Jurisdiction -- Abstention -- Right to Return to Federal Courts by Long, Robert B., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 42 | Number 4 Article 12
6-1-1964
Federal Jurisdiction -- Abstention -- Right to Return
to Federal Courts
Robert B. Long Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert B. Long Jr., Federal Jurisdiction -- Abstention -- Right to Return to Federal Courts, 42 N.C. L. Rev. 936 (1964).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol42/iss4/12
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necessarily follow that the Supreme Court should today incorporate
the Bill of Rights. Rather, stare decisis and the social pressures to
incorporate should be considered.
The social pressures to incorporate have been held to a minimum
by the "due process" clause. In order to insure justice, the Supreme
Court has not needed to incorporate the Bill of Rights in its en-
tirety.81 Instead, the Court, relying on the due process clause,
need only find that the state action violates "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." 2
This selective process has the advantage of not requiring that
all of the first eight amendments be applied against the states.
83
Some of the amendments are no longer as necessary as they once
were. For example, the second amendment guaranteeing the right
to bear arms is not as important today as it once was. Also, the
seventh amendment's twenty dollar maximum limit on certain trials
without a jury is outdated due to inflation.
Thus, even if it be assumed that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, respect for stare decisis,
plus lack of pressure to overrule past decisions are sufficient reasons
to reject Justice Black's incorporation theory8 4
FRANx H. WALKER, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Abstention-Right to Return to Federal Courts
The "abstention doctrine" is the name given to the principles
applied by the federal courts when they refuse to decide a case over
which they properly have jurisdiction,1 and leave the plaintiff with
the necessity of presenting part,' or all,3 of the questions in the
"' Green, supra note 63, at 906; Comment, The Adamson Case: A Study
in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 287 (1949); The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64, at 675." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
s" Green, supra note 89, at 906.
"' Purpose and Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 89, at
47; A Study in Constitutiotul Technique, supra note 106, at 268; The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 90.
' Abstention is a decision on the merits, one which comes after the
question of jurisdiction. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713 (1963) (per curiam) (implicit), 42 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1963).
'E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).3 E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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case to a state tribunal in order to get an adjudication of his rights.4
The power to decline to exercise jurisdiction was originally found
in the discretion of the chancellor sitting in equity,5 but recently
there have been indications that general policy considerations of
comity will allow abstention in suits at law, at least where a vital
interest of a state is involved.6 Although the doctrine is applied in
many situations, 7 the cases fall into two categories for the purposes
of this note: (1) those in which the federal action is merely stayed
until the state courts have had an opportunity to state authoritatively
what the state law is,' and (2) those in which the federal action is
dismissed,9 thus ending such a case's contact with the federal courts
until it comes to the Supreme Court from the state courts by appeal
or certiorari. In order to understand why a case is disposed of in
one or the other of these ways, it is first necessary to understand the
considerations that impel abstention in each class of cases.
'Up-to-date general discussions of the abstention doctrine are found in:
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1963) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Note,
59 COLUm. L. REv. 749 (1959); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
' Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
'Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28
(1959) (eminent domain proceeding removed to federal court on basis of
diversity). Cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (inter-
sovereign certification).
" "[I]t is more precise to refer to 'abstention doctrines' since there are
at least four distinguishable lines of cases, involving different factual situa-
tions, involving different procedural consequences, different support in the
decisions of the Supreme Court, and different arguments for and against
their validity." WRIGHT 169. Two of Professor Wright's "four dis-
tinguishable lines of cases" are not directly taken up here as they are only
collateral to the purposes of this note. One of these involves abstention
solely in order to "leave to the states ihe resolution of unsettled questions of
state law." Id. at 175. It had generally been thought that unsettled state law
alone was not sufficient reason for a federal court to abstain. Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, following what it thought to be the general trend Qf the cases,
recently held that it was proper for a federal court to abstain in private
diversity cases solely because the state law was unsettled and difficult to
ascertain. United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3400 (U.S. May 18, 1964) (No. 958).
The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, with only Justice Douglas
dissenting, leaves the state of the law in this area in confusion.
The other "distinguishable line of cases" involves abstention in order
"to ease the congestion of the federal court docket." VRIG3T 176-77.
Cases supporting abstention for this purpose are: P. Beiersdorf & Co. v.
McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1951); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1949). Contra, Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 835
(9th Cir. 1963).
8 See the cases cited in note 2 supra.
o See the cases cited in note 3 supra.
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Lurking behind all abstention cases are considerations of comity
between dual sovereigns, and a desire to avoid an unnecessary dis-
ruption by federal courts of state policies as expressed in state
statutes, case law, and administrative action.10 In the abstention
cases in which an order of dismissal is appropriate, these are the
primary considerations. Here, the federal courts completely defer
to the state tribunal because it is felt that "a state tribunal is a more
appropriate one for resolving the [whole] controversy."'" The
state tribunal is usually declared to be more appropriate "in order
to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its
own affairs."' 2  Thus, a federal court will not usually entertain
either a suit challenging state administrative action under a com-
plicated regulatory scheme,' 3 a suit for a declaratory judgment
against a state tax,"4 a suit to enjoin a state criminal prosecution, 5
or a suit to enjoin the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state
court.16 The plaintiff's federal constitutional claims can be pro-
tected through the appeal and certiorari procedures.'1
A different consideration is most often foremost in the thinking
of the courts when it is decided to stay the federal action rather than
dismiss. Here, the abstaining federal court is usually seeking to
avoid an unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional ques-
"The doctrine has been described as an extention by the courts of the
same policies embodied in the federal statutes providing for three-judge
district courts in suits seeking injunctions against state statutes and for-
bidding injunctions against certain types of state action. Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs L. REv. 815, 815-16 (1959);
Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 749-50 (1959). This conclusion finds support
in Justice Frankfurter's comment in the "original" abstention case that "this
use of equitable powers is a contribution of the courts in furthering the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need
of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers." Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
"England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
423 (1964) (concurring opinion).
SWRIGHT 172.
"3Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951)
(suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute which forbade discontinu-
ance of train service without permission of the commission); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (suit to enjoin the execution of a proration
order given by a state commission in charge of oil).
1, Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
"Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S.
458 (1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
•Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 US. 157, 163 (1943); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
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tions in a suit attacking state action.'8 It is a maxim of federal prac-
tice to avoid decisions on constitutional issues if the case can be
disposed of on other grounds. 9 In a situation where the state law
is uncertain and federal constitutional claims could be mooted, or
changed in nature," by construction of the state law, the reasoning
of the federal courts is simply this: Any determination by a federal
court as to the meaning of a state statute would only be tentative
since the state courts have the final word as to the meaning of
state law; therefore, the state court should be given an opportunity
to have the final word on it before a federal court measures it against
the strictures of the constitution.21 Abstention in this situation,
called Pullrnan-type abstention,22 involves no fundamental decision
that the state tribunal is a "more appropriate" one for the suit. This
is shown by the fact that abstention is improper when the state law
involved is settled,23 or clearly unconstitutional under any possible
construction of it.' Thus, the decision to abstain in this situation
is not to be made automatically merely because state law is involved2 5
but rather is to be made after considering these questions and also
weighing any possible factors that call for an immediate decision as
opposed to the delay engendered by abstention.2' As the Supreme
18 E.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134
(1962); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the
process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on
questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). Cf.
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
20 AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 596-98 (1946).
21Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500 (1941). The
federal courts have jurisdiction to decide ancilliary questions of state law in
federal question litigation. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175
(1909). This type of abstention, then, is a decision not to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the ancilliary questions. WRIGHT 170.
22 So called from the name of the first case in which this technique was
employed, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22 City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958);
Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
2 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (statute requiring
segregation).
25 It is error to automatically abstain. NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471
(1959) (per curiam).
2" Ordinarily, the fact that the delay caused by abstention will injure the
plaintiff's interests has not been considered by the courts in determining
whether or not they will abstain. However, there are recent indications that
such will no longer be the case, at least in civil rights litigation. In Griffin v.
County School Bd., 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4413 (U.S. May 25, 1964), the
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Court has said, "this principle does not.., involve the abdication of
federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise ....
Therefore, a stay of the federal action is all that is required in order
to carry out the purposes of this Pullman-type abstention, and it is
error to dismiss such a case." The plaintiff is entitled to an ad-
judication of his constitutional objections in the federal court once
the state court has settled, or had an opportunity to settle,20 the
state law in question.
Under Pullman-type abstention as originally contemplated, it
would seem that the plaintiff who has been sent back to the state
Virginia school-closing case, the Supreme Court reversed a circuit court
decision to abstain and proceeded to the merits of the case. The Court noted
that the issues had been passed upon by the state courts, but added: "[Q]uite
independently of this, we hold that the issues here imperatively call for
decision now. The case has been delayed since 1951 by resistance at the
state and county level, by legislation, and by lawsuits.... There has been
entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the con-
stitutional rights .... We accordingly reverse .... " Id. at 4415-16.
A similar point was made by the Court a week later in Baggett v. Bidlit,
32 U.S.L. WEnK 4425 (U.S. June 1, 1964). A three-judge district court
abstained in an action which sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
a Washington statute requiring an oath of allegiance from all teachers on the
grounds that the statute was void for vagueness. The Washington Court
had never been called upon to construe the statute. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action and proceeded to
the merits of the case. One of the reasons the Court gave for refusing to
abstain was that abstention would delay an "ultimate adjudication on the
merits for an undue length of time,... a result quite costly where the
vagueness of a state statute may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms." Id. at 4430. The main reason for the refusal to abstain, how-
ever, was the very vagueness of the statute itself. The question before the
Court was not whether the statute applied, but rather was one as to what
the statute required the plaintiff teachers to do upon taking the oath. The
Court noted that previous cases in which abstention was held proper all
involved "a choice between one or several alternative meanings of a state
statute." Id. In Baggett, however, the statute was "not open to one or a
few interpretations, but to an indefinite number" and the Court found it
"difficult to see how an abstract construction ... in a declaratory judgment
action could eliminate the vagueness from these terms" of the statute. Id.
The Court then added, in strong and positive language, that "it is fictional
to believe that anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact
of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of
permissible constitutional certainty. Abstention does not require this." Id.
The decision is sound, for if the result were otherwise, the right to a federal
court adjudication of the constitutional objection of vagueness to state statutes
would be seriously impaired.
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
28 Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
20 Besides leaving the case open so that the federal constitutional issues
may be litigated in .the federal court after the state law is settled, a stay
leaves the federal court in a position to decide the state issues if anything
should prevent getting a decision by the state courts within a reasonable time.
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courts for an adjudication of the state law questions would have to
present only his state law claims to those courts. However, in Gov-
ernment & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor,30 the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who returned to an abstaining
federal court was not entitled to an adjudication of his federal con-
stitutional objections there because he had not "presented" his
federal claims to the state court so as to enable it to construe the
state statute involved "in light of the constitutional objections." 1
This decision, combined with holdings that the plaintiff in such an
abstention case can "elect" to litigate all his claims, state and federal,
in a state court and then seek review in the Supreme Court,8" laid
the basis for a dangerous procedural trap. The Supreme Court gave
no guidelines as to what the plaintiff was required to do in order to
"present" his constitutional objections to the state courts. Neither
did it indicate what, short of seeking review in the Supreme Court,"
would constitute an "election" on the part of the plaintiff to litigate
his constitutional objections in the state courts. If the plaintiff liti-
gated his federal claims in the state courts, normal rules of res
judicata would bar him from relitigating them in a federal court.3
4
The question became one of how to "present" the constitutional
objections to the state court without "electing" to litigate them
there. The answers to this question were given in a recent Supreme
Court decision.
In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,35
plaintiff chiropractors sought a declaration that the educational re-
quirements of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act were unconstitu-
tional as applied to them, and also sought an injunction against the
act's enforcement as to them. A federal three-judge court ab-
stained sua sponte, 6 staying the proceedings in the federal court
until the courts of Louisiana had an opportunity to construe the
statute and make a determination of the state law issue of whether
the act applied to chiropractors. In the state court, plaintiffs briefed
and argued their fourteenth amendment objections to the applica-
"353 U.S. 364 (1957).
3 fId. at 366.
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
"See the cases cited in note 32 supra.
"Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
"375 U.S. 411 (1964).
"England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 180 F. Supp.
121 (E.D. La. 1960).
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tion of the act to chiropractors in the belief that the Windsor de-
cision required them to do so. In this way, the constitutional ob-
jections were "presented" to the state court. An intermediate ap-
pellate court held that the act applied to chiropractors and that so
applied, it did not violate the fourteenth amendment.17  The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court refused to review this decision.38 The plaintiffs
then returned to the federal district court and again sought an in-
junction and a declaration that the act, now construed by the state
court to apply to them, violated the fourteenth amendment. The
district court dismissed,3 9 saying that the litigation of the constitu-
tional objections in the state court barred the plaintiffs from raising
them again in the federal court. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal. The Court shed some light on this area by
saying that the willing litigation of their constitutional claims in a
state proceeding, as here, would normally bar a relitigation of them
in the federal courts. The Court, however, was unwilling to apply
the rule announced in the case to these plaintiffs who had only done
what they thought, with some reason,40 Windsor required.40:
", England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So. 2d 51
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
'; England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, Docket No.
45,509, Louisiana Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 1961.
" England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1961).
,o The Court expressly noted that Windsor had been interpreted by others,
including the district court here involved, as requiring such a submission of
federal claims to the state courts. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 420 (1964). Further, the Court noted the mis-
leading quality of the abstention order which had directed the "appellants to
obtain a state court determination not of the state question alone but of 'the
issues here presented' ....." Id. at 422 n.14.
, 0a The fact that the rule set out by the court was not applied to the facts
in the case, but was announced to operate prospectively as to all later cases is
an interesting aspect of this case. The decision cannot'be called a "prospec-
tive overruling decision" because it overrules nothing. The decision in
Windsor is not changed. It is said to require nothing more or less than it
ever did. What the case does say is that the plaintiff here was laboring
under a reasonable misapprehension as to what Windsor required. See note
40 supra. The Court seems to be formulating a rule that where willfulness is
required in order to give an act significance and the law by which willfulness
is to be measured is in a confused state, any rule of law, given by the Court
in such a situation which sets forth an objective standard against which to
measure whether the act was willful or not, will be applied prospectively.
This is because the party charged with willfulness cannot be said to have
that subjective state of mind unless there is an objective standard given
by law to measure his acts. Thus, in England, the plaintiff was re-
quired to have willingly litigated his claims in the state courts before the right
to return to federal court was waived. If what Windsor required was un-
[Vol. 42
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The opinion clarified the meaning of Windsor and gave to liti-
gants in abstention cases the much-needed guidelines for preserving
the right to return to the federal courts. The basic proposition un-
derlying the reasoning of the Court in this area is that a party who
has "properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court
to consider federal constitutional claims"'" should not be unwillingly
deprived of his right to have that court decide those constitutional
issues on the basis of its own findings of fact.4" The abstention
doctrine does not alter this proposition; "its recognition of the role
of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disre-
gard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions
of federal law."4 From these principles, it necessarily follows that
Windsor does not require the federal claims to be litigated in the
state courts, and the Court so stated. Furthermore, complying with
Windsor by "presenting" his federal claims to the state courts "will
not support a conclusion... that a litigant has freely and without
reservation litigated his federal claims in the state courts and so
elected not to return to the District Court.
' 44
It is obvious now that the presentation of the federal constitu-
tional claims to the state courts as contemplated by Windsor involves
nothing more than drawing the state court's attention to those claims.
The Court in England, however, recognized that the litigant in a
Pullman-type case faces a great temptation to argue the constitutional
issues. This temptation results from what might be called the
"coercive" effect of arguing such claims. That is, if the litigant is
clear, as it was, then he cannot be said to have willingly litigated when such
was done only to comply with what he thought Windsor required.
A somewhat similar view was held by three judges in the Court's opinion
in a recent prosecution for willful evasion of taxes. James v. United States,
366 U.S. 213 (1961). The petitioner failed to pay income taxes on funds
which he had embezzled. He was convicted of willfully attempting to evade
the federal income tax. A previous decision had held such funds not to be
taxable income. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). In James,
the Court overruled this previous decision and held such funds to be taxable.
The conviction was reversed and the case dismissed with three justices
agreeing in the opinion of the Court that the element of willfulness could
not be found when the former decision had held such income to be non-
taxable. The other three votes for dismissal came from justices who thought
the former decision had been decided correctly. For a full discussion of
this case, see Note, 71 YALE, L.J. 907 (1962).
375 U.S. at 415.
,The Court stressed the importance of the right to a record constructed
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able to convince a state court that a statute is unconstitutional if
applied to him, the court, in close cases, might be more likely to
construe it to not apply to him.45 In contemplation of such a situa-
tion, perhaps, the England decision states that the litigant may re-
move all doubts as to his intentions by making an explicit reservation
preserving his right to return to the district court "in all events."'"0
This is accomplished by putting into the state record a statement
that "he is exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose
of complying with Windsor, and that he intends, should the state
courts hold against him on the question of state law, to return to the
District Court for disposition of his federal contentions."47  Thus,
when he explicitly makes the reservation, it appears the litigant will
always have the right to return to district court. A reservation of this
type is not necessary to preserve the right to return to the district
court,4" but the litigant in such an abstention case is running a risk
46 Id. at 420-21.16 Id. at 421-22.
47 Id. at 421.
"' Id. at 421. The England decision probably precludes the approach taken
in the case of Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959). There, a Negro plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of North
Carolina voting laws in a federal court. The three-judge district court
abstained because the state law was unsettled and the nature of the constitu-
tional question was uncertain. Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295
(E.D.N.C. 1957). The plaintiff then went to the state tribunals and elected
to litigate in those tribunals the constitutionality on its face of a voting re-
quirements statute. The plaintiff did not, however, raise the issue of whether
the law was being applied in a discriminatory manner. The Supreme Court
affirmed the state court holding that the statute was constitutional on its face,
but indicated that the plaintiff could go back to the federal court to litigate
the discriminatory application issue. 360 U.S. at 50. This decision actually
goes further than the scheme of state courts deciding state issues and federal
courts deciding federal issues as envisioned and provided for in the England
decision. It allows the piecemeal litigation of the federal issues in a case.
This result is inconsistent with the rule of res judicata normally applied in
the federal courts. Where the parties and the subject matter are the same
in a second suit as they were in a prior suit, a judgment on the merits in the
prior suit is usually res judicata in the second "not only as respects matters
actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted, but also as respects
any other available matter which might have been presented to that end."
Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 479 (1930). The inconsistency
is perhaps justifiable because the findings of fact made by a federal court
are much more important on issues of discriminatory application than they
are on the issue of on-the-face constitutionality. See Note, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 226, 237-38 (1959). Allowing the litigant to have the more abstract
question of constitutionality on the face decided in the state courts without
giving up the right to have the discrimination issue tried in federal court
would remove to a certain extent the objection to abstention based on time
consumed. It would give the litigant a chance to perhaps get a quicker de-
cision securing his rights and yet leave him in a position to take advantage of
[Vol. 42
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of being found to have willingly waived that right if he does try to
"coerce" the state court into construing the statute to be inapplicable
to him by arguing the constitutional claims. 9
The England decision is praiseworthy because it clears up the
procedural haze which has obscured the object of abstention by a
federal court in a Pullman-type situation-which is to get an
authoritative determination of state law issues-and because it shows
that abstention is not entirely an abdication of federal jurisdiction.
But the case also points up some serious objections to abstention in
general. Most obvious is the expense involved in taking a case to
the highest court of a state in order to qualify the litigant to have
his federal claims heard in a federal court. Needless to say, this
factor alone is enough to convince many litigants they should "elect"
to have their federal claims heard in the state courts rather than in
the federal courts where the Constitution and Congress have placed
jurisdiction. The time involved in qualifying the party to litigate
his federal constitutional question in the federal courts is also an
objection." It too helps the litigant to ."elect" to have the state
courts decide his constitutional claims. Compounding these objec-
tions is the fact that abstention in Pullman-type cases is no longer
a discretionary maneuver to avoid ticklish problems, but rather is
applied as an iron-clad rule. As Justice Frankfurter said, "where
the issue.., involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state
statute where, if applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, we
have required District Courts, and not merely sanctioned an exercise
of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the
the neutrality of the federal courts on the issue of discrimination if the
attack on its face failed. However, it is doubtful whether Lassiter has
survived England because England speaks in terms of giving up the right to
return to the federal courts by willingly litigating constitutional issues in the
state courts. "We now explicitly hold that if a party freely and without
reservation submits his federal claims for decision by the state courts, litigates
them there, and has them decided there, then ... he has elected to forego his
right to return to the District Court." England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964).
o The same result should be achieved in diversity cases where the
federal court abstains merely because a difficult question of state law is in-
volved. See cases cited notes 6 & 7 supra. The litigant should be allowed to
return to the federal court for the trial of the case after the state law has
been settled by means of a declaratory judgment. In this way, the litigant
would receive the protection of the federal courts against local prejudice
which diversity is designed to guard against.
"0 See the discussion by Professor Wright of the five-year litigation in
the Windsor case which ended without a decision on the merits. Wright,
supra note 10, at 817-18.
19641
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submission of the state law question to state determination."'" This
indiscriminate use of the abstention technique and the consequent
time and expense involved in getting back into federal court as-
suredly amount to a partial abdication of federal jurisdiction. 2
The use of the federal courts in these situations is effectively re-
moved from those who do not have the time or the money for such
a long, expensive effort. The abstention doctrine is so entrenched
today that it is doubtful that any changes will be made in its applica-
tion despite the objectionable features mentioned here. The lawyer,
however, should keep these possible results in mind and let them be
his guideposts in deciding whether or not to carry his case to the
federal courts.
ROBERT B. LONG, JR.
Real Property-Implied Warranties in New Housing
In a recent Colorado case,1 the purchaser of a house brought suit
against the vendor-builder for loss suffered as a result of the defec-
tive condition of the house. Prior to the purchase of the then in-
completed house, plaintiff inspected the property and noted that
caissons were being constructed for the foundation of the adjoining
house. Upon inquiry about soil conditions, defendant assured plain-
tiff that similar precautions had already been taken in the construc-
tion of his house. After accepting the deed and entering into pos-
session, plaintiff-vendee discovered that the foundation was inade-
quate for the type of soil involved. The Supreme Court of Colorado
held the builder liable for breach of a implied warranty of fitness
for habitation.2
" Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28
(1959)." "Delay which the Pullman doctrine sponsors, keeps the status quo
entrenched and renders 'a defendant's judgment' even in the face of constitu-
tional requirements.... [L]itigants seeking the protection of the federal
courts for assertion of their civil rights will be ground down slowly by the
passage of time and the expenditure of money in state proceedings, leaving
the ultimate remedy here, at least in many cases, an illusory one." England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 436-37 (1964)
(concurring opinion).
1 Glisan v. Smolenske, - Colo. -, 387 P.2d 260 (1963). The defendant-
vendor was held liable for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
habitability when cracks began appearing in the surfaces of the house.
2 The principal case involved a contract to purchase a house then in
the process of construction; however, although the court allowed recovery
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